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The Biopolitical Economy of Anti-Essentialism
Abstract
If we are to understand the nature of the relationship between a culture and its economy it is necessary to
trace out the logic that informs the apparently disparate currents that make up that culture and its
economy. There are any number of loci by reference to which this relationship might be discerned, but
none are so important or profound, or for that matter so telling, than our body. Following on from two
previous articles this essay approaches the subject by way of Foucault’s understanding of the
‘biopolitical’.[1] Through the issues of sexuality and eugenics we see how the logic informing early
modern liberal philosophy worked itself out, coming to its full realisation in what is today referred to as
‘anti-essentialism’.
The rise of anti-essentialism is concomitant with, if not identical with, the rise of capitalism proper. Antiessentialism, both as a cultural and economic phenomena, is necessary for the rise to global dominance
of capitalism. Although anti-essentialism is often thought of in terms of postmodernism and performance
theory something of its logic was understood in the early modern period. And it was so by way of
opposition to the growing defence and acceptance of free-market economics, which acceptance went
hand in glove with a free market in credit and debt, which is to say in the liberalisation of anti-usury laws.

Cover Page Footnote
[1] These being, ‘Promoting what we Oppose: Faith, the Free Market, and First Things’ Solidarity: The
Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics: Vol. 3: Iss. 1, Article 1, 2013; ‘Promoting what we
Oppose – Part 2’ Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics: Vol. 4: Iss. 1,
Article 6, 2014.
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The Biopolitical Economy of Anti-Essentialism
Robert Tilley

I.

Foucault and the Birth of the Biopolitical

In a lecture given on the 7th of January 1976, Michel Foucault observed how there was
what he called a “strange efficacy” to the attacks directed at “traditional morality and
hierarchy.” He went on to expand upon this saying that “what has emerged in the course of the
last ten or fifteen years is a sense of the increasing vulnerability to criticism of things,
institutions, practices, discourses. A certain fragility has been discovered in the very bedrock
of existence.” And this especially so in those aspects “most familiar, most solid and most
intimately related to our bodies and to our everyday behaviour.”1 Everything once thought to
be firm, solid, and lasting was instead so fragile that it was dissolving before our eyes, even
our very bodies were proving to be less substantial than we might have thought.
Foucault’s language alludes to the famous passage in The Communist Manifesto which
sums up the effects of capitalism on traditional doctrines and institutions in a similar way: “All
that is solid melts into air; everything sacred is profaned.” Under the effects of capital things
once deemed substantial and lasting begin to dissolve. The very essence of things is turned
evanescent. Foucault’s point was that in the preceding ten to fifteen years this process had
picked up a pace such that its effects were now clearly discernible to all for the reason that that
which is closest to one, namely one’s very body, has likewise succumbed. The everyday
becomes increasingly different to how it was experienced a decade or two previous.
Two to three years later, Foucault would pursue this theme in more depth in a series of
lectures later published under the title The Birth of Biopolitics.2 The role of the body, we read,
had been completely subsumed into the economic machinery of production, which economy
can be referred to under the heading ‘neo-liberal’. But what exactly does this mean?
There is much in Foucault that repays close reading, and doing so soon puts the lie to
the popular and misguided idea that he was a dedicated anti-capitalist, even a doctrinaire
Marxist. His lectures on the Biopolitical are not in the order of an outright attack on neoliberalism. Indeed some feel (and I am sympathetic to their view) that one can detect something
of a note of approval on Foucault’s part.3 Contrary to what many think, it can be argued that
Foucault was far from being a Marxist in anything but a very loose and qualified way.4 But
Michel Foucault ‘Lecture 1 of Two Lectures’ in Michel Foucault Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and
Other Writings 1972-1977, ed. C. Gordon (New York: Vintage Books, 1980), 80.
2
Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College De France 1978-79. (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2010). Foucault discussed the theme of population control and power in an early series of lectures
published under the title Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France 1977-78.
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). In brief his argument here is that in the eighteenth century the way in
which power operated underwent a conceptual (and category) shift. From governing a nation of subjects,
government ruled over a “set of natural phenomena” (352) namely a population described in terms of
demographic regularities. Power, writes Foucault, now “has the population as its target, political economy as its
major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument” (108). As will be
argued below, undergirding and informing this turn was natural law understood in terms of mathematics.
3
For example see the comments by Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis go to Waste: How
Neoliberalism survived the Financial Meltdown. (London: Verso, 2013), 61, 97-101.
4
See Jennifer Cotter ‘The New Class Common- Sense Biopolitics, Posthumanism, and Love’ in Human, all too
(Post) Human, eds. Jennifer Cotter et al. (London: Lexington Books, 2016), 15-64. Cotter critiques Foucault
(and Hardt and Negri as well as Agamben as well) to the effect that he ‘spiritualizes’ away the concrete fact of
class replacing it with ‘life’ and the dialectics of labour and exploitation with notions of love (16, 18-21).
1
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what he did set out to do was to take seriously the Marxist imperative to think through the
relationship between base and superstructure; the ways in which the economy, politics and
culture are inextricably entwined. Foucault’s argument was that the best term to use today to
clarify and explain this relationship was that of the ‘biopolitical’.5
Foucault’s argument in his series of lectures was that classical liberalism, in its
economic, political and cultural expressions, was changing via an American inspired “anarchocapitalism” and for this reason how it is liberalism is to be understood has changed. The old
traditions and hierarchies had, as it were, dissolved. The contemporary form of neo-liberal
hegemony was rather different to that of classical liberalism.6 For a start, neo-liberalism sees
the market as a “formal system” by which is meant that it needs no reference to anything outside
of its own logic and dynamic. It is subordinate to nothing else, which ultimately means that all
else becomes subordinate to it. This rise to dominance is seen especially so in the neo-liberal
system’s control over population; over what others call the powers of reproduction. Foucault
stresses that these controls are not outside or even peripheral to the neo-liberal system, they are
central to and integral to its operation. The system is self-regulating and self-referential; it is a
formal system.7 Contrary to how many would describe our world, Foucault argues that we are
not a “supermarket society” but are rather an “enterprise society.” Homo oeconomicus today is
revealed as “the man of enterprise and production.”8 Man is “an entrepreneur of
himself…being for himself his own capital.”9 This does not mean that our society cannot be
described as a vast supermarket, but that informing this idea, dominant over this idea, is that of
entrepreneurship. The reason for this is as follows.
The issues revolve around the concept of freedom, a concept integral to how modernity
came to understand itself. But what kind of freedom are we speaking about when we discuss
the nature of liberalism? Foucault’s point is that there can be detected a change from a classical
liberal understanding of freedom (one in which the autonomous individual acts responsibly as
a civilian in a civil society, which society is oriented by a concept of progress that carries with
it a reasonable hope for the perfection of humanity), to a more ‘anarchist’ concept of freedom
(one in which all is subject to the entrepreneurial will, including the very concept of the self).
Whereas the classical liberal held to humanist ideals, the neo-liberal ethos dissolves all such
ideals. Indeed it dissolves all ideas of essence, which is to say of a nature proper to things, be
this of the idea of a “bedrock to existence” or of something called ‘humanity’, or even the idea
of the self. If God is dead, said Foucault, it is a mistake to think that His place is taken by Man.
But what of the body, surely this was something with essence, a biological given, something
solid and something definable? But even here, says Foucault, in “the last ten to fifteen years”
a change is evident, it too becomes something less than solid. It is, however, a change that finds
“Biopolitics and transspecies posthumanism articulate the ‘spiritual aroma’ – the cultural imaginary – of
transnational capital now” (22). In an interview with G. Raulet, Foucault locates Marxist thought within a
distinctively liberal genealogy and tells his interlocutor that he waits for a return to Marxism but one that
liberates Marx from “party dogma” (‘Structuralism and Post-structuralism’ in Michel Foucault Aesthetics,
Method, and Epistemology, ed. J. Faubian (London: Penguin Books, 1998), 458).
5
It ought to be noted here, at the beginning of this paper, that I will not in this paper be discussing the work of
Deleuze and Guattari or that of Giorgio Agamben, figures whose names regularly occur in context of
discussions on the biopolitical. The reason for this is that I want to discuss them in a later article, along with
Derrida. As will be made clear in that future article I view these figures, to use a well-worn saying, not as part of
the solution, but as part of the problem. I will argue that their writings represent a continuation of the
biopolitical. They do so because exactly when they seem to oppose capitalism they promote it, for their writings
(especially those of Deleuze and Guattari) embody and foster the obfuscating logic of a usurious ideology.
6
Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 133.
7
Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 20-1, 137, 171-4.
8
Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 147.
9
Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 226.
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its earlier intimations back in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and that with the birth of
the idea of ‘sexuality’. A term that today is found at the centre of most, if not all, cultural issues,
it being the cause célèbre of identity politics especially in the Western world.
In his History of Sexuality, Foucault famously argued that the idea of ‘sexuality’ was a
creation of the middle modern period, in particular the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. By
this he meant that in the pre-modern and early modern periods sexual acts were judged by
reference to an often theologically informed morality and not by reference to later so-called
scientific or medical categories which tended to naturalise these acts. Thus, prior to the rise of
classical liberalism there was no such thing as homosexuality insofar as that term constituted a
distinct category of sexuality; there was only the act, for example, of sodomy, which was an
act to be assessed by reference to moral standards.10 It was the new scientific/medical line of
reasoning that came to inform what we would call classical liberalism. A form of thinking that
saw itself as enlightened by reason that it judged things under the strictures of observational
science; by way of methods empirical and not theological.11
As is well known Foucault went on to argue that this reasoning gave rise to different
forms of discipline and punishment and to the ideal of a society run under the model of the
‘panopticon’, something made possible by the way in which the logic and values of this new
dispensation became internalised by individuals. Interesting as this is it is not what concerns
us here. What does concern us, however, is how this relates to the other very modern and
classical liberal concern namely population control. Foucault writes that one “of the great
innovations in the techniques of power in the eighteenth century was the emergence of
‘population’ as an economic and political problem.”12 A little later he goes on to say that
through “the political economy of population there was formed a whole grid of observations
regarding sex.”13 The rise of sexuality and population control form an inextricable bond and
they do so concomitant with the rise of an increasingly dominant liberal economic philosophy.
They do so under the aegis of what we would call ‘scientism’ an ideology in which the claim
is made that science (here economic, medical and population science) operates indifferently
and objectively, being informed by the very nature of things. Being so informed it demands the
acceptance of all who are enlightened, not least those who exercise political and cultural power.
It is this system that will ultimately work itself out into neo-liberalism, only the latter will end
up turning on its progenitor, not least by calling into question any and all concepts of a nature
proper to things. Hence, whereas the classical liberalism held to the death of God,
neoliberalism has brought about (or attended) the death of Man; whereas classical liberalism
held that there was an essence to things, neoliberalism inculcates and promulgates what is often
referred to as ‘anti-essentialism’.
When Foucault refers to a certain “fragility” having been discovered in the “very
bedrock of existence” although we are tempted to read this as meaning the kind of traditional
morality associated with pre-modern or early modern times, we would be mistaken. In a rather
10

Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction. Volume 1. (New York: Vintage Books, 1990
[1976]), 40-43, 68.
11
As Arnold Davidson put it in his book The Emergence of Sexuality: Historical Epistemology and the
Formation of Concepts (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000): Prior to the 19th century questions
of sexual perversity “were not cloaked in silence or secrecy, but were dealt with primarily in treatises of moral
philosophy, moral theology, and jurisprudence, and not in medicine” (23). He thus follows Foucault in asserting
that the “archaeology of perversion is a crucial stage in understanding the history of the twentieth-century self”
(29). As we will see below, for Foucault this ‘self’ was one that was not be understood by way of identity but as
a creative force, it being its own object of creation – in short, the entrepreneurial self.
12
Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 25.
13
Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 26.
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subtle way (and witty way – for Foucault was not only a very clear and elegant writer but a
witty one as well) he was applying this to the traditions of classical liberalism, even (in other
essays) to psychoanalysis and Marxism. We might say to the traditional givens of the
contemporary left. I do not think it illegitimate to say that for Foucault neo-liberalism with its
“anarcho-capitalist” concept of freedom, a freedom to make of oneself what one will, an
entrepreneurial freedom, was exciting, liberating, and progressive. It is anything but
conservative: “On the contrary, it is to be essentially progressive in the sense of a constant
adaptation of the legal order to scientific discoveries, to the progress of economic organization
and technique, to changes in the structure of society, and to the requirements of contemporary
consciousness.”14
The above is a rather lengthy introduction to this paper proper, but as Foucault is often
the reference point by which discussion on the biopolitical begins (even as is often the case by
way of critiquing him) then it seems appropriate to begin in this way. It also serves to highlight
the issues that are dominant today and how it is they have developed over the middle to late
modern periods. Given that the term ‘biopolitical’ is used by not a few theorists to refer to the
trajectory of modernity it is appropriate then to turn to the topic of eugenics, for if there is one
topic that has found wide acceptance across the various and often competing strains of
modernity it is just this topic.
“Eugenics was a fundamental aspect of some of the most important cultural and social
movements of the twentieth century, intimately linked to ideologies of ‘race’, nation, and sex,
inextricably meshed with population control, social hygiene, state hospitals, and the welfare
state,” so wrote Frank Dikötter in his study on ‘Race Culture’.15 Dikötter went on to say, that
“eugenics belonged to the political vocabulary of virtually every significant modernizing force
between the two world wars,” being embraced by those “from one end of the political spectrum
to the other, including British conservatives and Spanish anarchists.” It’s a point Marius Turda
takes up and pursues in more detail. Eugenics, he writes, is the “emblematic expression of
programmatic modernism.”16 A program that, being entwined with the newly arising politics
of population control, came to be associated with “nationalism, liberalism, social democracy,
anarchism, communism and fascism.”17 Turda writes how “Biopolitics…operated through
investigations of biological processes regulating the triadic relationship between the individual,
the nation and the state.”18 For this reason a “new rationality was needed as the foundation of
the modern biopolitical state.”19 It is this new rationality that is summed up under the term the
‘biopolitical’ and which serves to unite the otherwise disparate currents of modernity. What
tends to be obscured in a good deal of discussion on eugenics is that although eugenics has a
role in those aforementioned disparate currents it nevertheless represents a logic that finds its
origin and locus proper in cultural and political liberalism and, thereby, in capitalism. An
argument that the history of eugenics bears out.
Many people tend to identify eugenics with its best known and abhorrent expression,
namely the Final Solution of Hitler’s Germany. But Hitler’s Germany was comparatively late
on the scene in terms of programmatic and state intervention in matters of population control,
whereas it was those countries informed by developing liberal philosophies that led the way,
14

Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 161-2.
Frank Dikötter, ‘Race Culture: Recent Perspectives on the History of Eugenics,’ The American Historical
Review 103, no. 2 (1998): 467.
16
Marius Turda, Modernism and Eugenics. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 2.
17
Turda, 1.
18
Turda, 113.
19
Turda, 112.
15
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providing the model and the spur for the Nazis.20 Liberalism and its attendant progressivism
were very much in the forefront of population control and thus eugenics, not least as a means
of colonial and post-colonial management of what we might now call the peoples of
‘developing nations’.21 A practice that had an important role to play in Cold War politics to
contain the spread of communism to poorer countries.22
It is not the intention of this paper to rehearse the history of eugenics and population
control, something already done not only in the works already cited but in other works besides.
Rather is the aim of this paper to tease out something of the deeper logic of eugenics and,
thereby, to shed light on the nature of the biopolitical as the locus of the relationship between
economic and cultural liberalism.
There are two general currents in the history of modern eugenics, the preoccupation of
one has to do with racial purity and regeneration, the other with class politics and an attendant
concern over the economic well-being of the state. Both express themselves by reference to the
so-called science of population control. The two currents cannot so neatly be separated off, for
it is clear that class politics often informs racial concerns, and vice versa. At a deeper level we
will see that what informs both currents is the language of a specific economic theory, one
informed by the rejection of premodern and early modern theological concepts concerning the
very constitution of nature and, concomitant with this, the revisioning of the raison d’etre of
morality. The language of morality is often invoked but what now informs the telos or purpose
of morality are the principles of efficiency and productivity, which principles are, from the late
See: Edwin Black, War Against the Weak: Eugenics and America’s Campaign to Create a Master Race. (New
York: Four Walls, Eight Windows, 2003); Rodger Griffin, Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning
under Mussolini and Hitler. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). Griffin writes that Auschwitz represented a
modernist purity, a “vast biopolitical sewage works, a technocratic installation where human waste products
were disposed of” (333); Richard Weikart, From Darwin to Hitler: Evolutionary Ethics, Eugenics, and racism
in Germany. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); James Whitman, Hitler’s American Model: The United
States and the Making of Nazi Race Law. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016).
21
See Michael Freeden, ‘Eugenics and Progressive Thought: A Study in Ideological Affinity’ in his collection
Liberal Languages: Ideological Imagination and Twentieth-Century Progressive Thought. (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2005). On post-colonial programs see: Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of
Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 49, 62,
111-114. It was only with the rise of Nehru and the formation of what used to be called a ‘third world’ block
that the dominance of white European concerns began to be checked (25, 169). See also Duncan Ivison,
Postcolonial Liberalism. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). One might also note how the
Biopolitics of population control especially of poorer countries is still being played out, albeit under a more
‘enlightened’ discourse of women’s reproductive rights and matters ecological. See, Matthew Connelly, Fatal
Misconception: The Struggle to Control the World Population. (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 2008). The more polemical and politically informed critique of this as a rule comes
from Christian, more specifically Catholic authors. For example see the essays in Michael Cook, ed. The New
Imperialism: World Population and the Cairo Conference. (Sydney: Little Hills Press, 1994); Jacqueline Kasun,
The War Against Population: The Economics and Ideology of World Population Control. (San Francisco:
Ignatius Press, 1999).
22
This included the dissemination of contraception and increasingly the introduction of abortion rights in
developing countries. This anti-communist tactics found a place in the 1960s rise of so-called counter-culture
sexual libertarianism. See: David Allyn, Make Love not War: The Social Revolution an Unfettered History.
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 2000). Allyn notes that a key moment came when President Lyndon B.
Johnson announced the promotion of birth control abroad in order to stop the “explosion in world population
and the growing scarcity in world resources” (30). At the time some in America saw the reason behind the
promotion of population control differently. Thus, the NAACP in 1965 charged Planned Parenthood with
helping Negroes to commit racial suicide (40). Carrie Pitzulo, Bachelors and Bunnies: The Sexual Politics of
Playboy. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2011). Pitzulo writes that attempting “to minimize the influence
of communism on unstable regions, American foreign policy increasingly focused on overpopulation in the
Third World” (162).
20
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eighteenth century on, often presented under the language of ‘hygiene’. The presence of too
many people (and that predominantly of the wrong type) spells problems for the body of the
nation as well as being a source of the corruption and degradation of the land. These problems
will first of all be evident in matters economic and thus must be answered by reference to
economic principles, something writ large in the writings of Thomas Robert Malthus (17661834).

II.

The Malthusian Moment

Malthus represents the more congenial face of population control in that he is not an
early advocate of what would later be termed eugenics (a term coined later in time by Francis
Galton). Indeed, it is argued that his arguments arose in part to oppose utopian ideas of human
perfectibility, ones associated with the likes of William Godwin and the Marquis de Condorcet.
As eugenics would later come to be associated with the idea of the perfection of the human
species (or a part thereof), then is it just, some may ask, for Malthus to be seen as an early
progenitor of eugenics simply because he advocated forms of population control? Rather, ought
not Malthus to be understood as following in the line of the Scottish Enlightenment of figures
such Hume and Adam Smith whom he admired?23
Malthus was concerned not only about the risk of famine due to the failure of agriculture
to keep up with the population of the British Isles, but of the kind of social and political
upheaval that such a famine would bring. Especially among those who had fallen under the
influence of those revolutionary ideas present on the Continent. The French Revolution was a
concern for many, especially those in the more favoured classes, a concern that was exacerbated
by the series of constitutional crises between the then monarch, George III, and parliament. 24
Malthus was representative of the enlightened, progressivist, and liberal politics of his day, he
was in short a Whig. But he was a Whig to err on the side of caution. His politics were tempered
by the rejection of the kinds of ‘metaphysical’ claims that attended the rise of the French
Revolution. Claims that informed the aforementioned utopian-like beliefs of thinkers such as
Godwin. (This rejection of matters metaphysical in the field of politics and culture was most
famously expressed by Edmund Burke in his critique of the Revolution when he traced its
utopian ideas back to what he claimed to be the metaphysics of Rousseau.) We might say that
Malthus’ was a politics of cautious improvement rather than zealous perfectibility. In this he
represents the dominant current in British liberalism, with what has come to be referred to as
‘classical liberalism’. Nevertheless, as Foucault noted, classical liberalism would give rise to
and be succeeded by neoliberalism and, as a consequence, to the dominance of the biopolitical,
with all of that it entails, including, of course, eugenics. It is with eugenics that the belief in the
perfectibility of humanity (or a part thereof) again comes to the fore and that attended by the
claim of being expressive of modern developments in the sciences.
Much of this may be a problem of definition insofar as when people spoke of the
perfectibility of humanity they meant something like the greater improvement of humanity. It
is a fine line between the ideas of improvement and perfection in any political vision informed
by the idea of progress. As we will see a little later in this article, in more recent times the
biopolitical logic inherent in liberalism is working itself out in a way that promotes a vision of
See Roy Porter ‘The Malthusian Moment’ (57-72) in Malthus, Medicine, and Morality: ‘Malthusianism’ after
1798, ed. B. Dolan (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000), 58-59.
24
See Nobuhiko Nakazawa, ‘Malthus’s Political Views in 1798: A ‘Foxite’ Whig?’ History of Economics
Review, 56, no. 1 (2012): 14-28. For a general background of the period see, Jennifer Mori, William Pitt and the
French Revolution, 1785-1795. (Edinburgh: Keele University Press, 1997).
23
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progress that entails far more than merely an ‘improvement’ of the species, rather than
perfection the vision is one of transformation.
Here we need to go deeper into the logic of classical liberalism so as to see the
continuity between it and neoliberalism, to do so by charting out their common origin and how
they work themselves out in the rise to dominance of the biopolitical. In order to do this we
need to turn to matters economic.
Malthus was a proponent of political-economy and for this and other reasons scholars
trace out the influences on his ideas of theorists such as Adam Smith and Ricardo. But as
Samuel Hollander has argued whatever served to influence Malthus was not taken on board in
an uncritical fashion. Though he corresponded a great deal with Ricardo, Malthus thought his
work needed improving and that he was the man to do it.25 The point here is that Malthus did
so (following the method of those who preceded him) by way of mathematics. Fundamental to
his arguments, as he himself allowed, was the “arithmetic ratio” of food increase to the
“geometric ratio” of population increase.26 Here was the equivalent of the Golden Mean in
things social and political.
It has been said that Malthus’ arguments were not new, that others had preceded him,
that although he met with informed and often strident criticism that these arguments won out
by reason that they were not solely Malthus’ own.27 All of this is no doubt true, but issues of
authorship of ideas to one side what these arguments witness to is that given the underlying
principles of modernity there was a certain inevitability in the working out of its logic, and that
on a global scale. Every area of life, inclusive now of human life in its most intimate and basic
of concerns, namely reproduction, was coming under the sway of this logic. As we will see
below, it would become a truly global ideology. It might be said by historians of ideas that
Malthus was the lucky one who “caught the tide” (as Smith has it28), but fair or unfair to others
who preceded him he now stands as the locus of the rise to dominance of a distinctly liberal
political economy which would later develop into ‘the biopolitical’.
What kind of logic was it that informed the thinking of Malthus and the economy under
which he lived? The answer is not hard to divine given what has been noted above, it was the
logic of mathematics. Science and mathematics came to be seen as being of a piece, for with
the rise to dominance of empiricism in order for a science to be a science proper it needed to
quantify results and (almost inevitably) it thereby quantified those things that were the subject
of those results. It is well known that the means by which we study a subject can shape the way
we think about that subject. Hence the imperative for hermeneutics whereby we study the ways
in which we study. It is of utmost importance that a researcher pay close and critical attention
to their method so that he or she does not end up defining the object of their study by way of
that same method. All too often the result of our study can be that our findings are little more
than artefacts of the method employed. To study things human by way of sciences that employ
mathematical means will result in seeing things human in terms of mathematical quantities that
can, thereby, be manipulated as one might manipulate the numbers on a page. It was this that
informed the arguments and thus the findings of Malthus, just as it informed those criticisms
levelled against him. Malthus was wrong because he got his maths wrong, not because he was

25

Samuel Hollander, The Economics of Thomas Robert Malthus. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).
Hollander, 13, 18-21.
27
See Kenneth Smith, The Malthusian Controversy. (New York: Routledge, 2006 [1951]).
28
Smith, The Malthusian Controversy, 324.
26
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using an inappropriate method. It needs to be stressed that among those who mattered, he was
neither critiqued for his assumptions nor for his method.29
The proper study of humanity, as well as the subsequent governing and shaping of
humanity, were to be carried out informed by the strictures of modern science, which science
was informed by the discipline of mathematics. It is important to understand that this approach
to the study and governance of humanity was, in early modernity, evident in the rise of an
economic theory based on an understanding of nature very different to that which preceded it
in Scholasticism. A theory that would champion liberalism by reference to the freedom of the
markets which came to include the freedom to lend money at interest, as well as early forms of
what we would now call currency speculation. In short, an economic theory and practice that
would soon develop into what we call capitalism.
Contrary to what is popularly thought, Adam Smith was not the founder of capitalism
in any sense of that term. Some may claim him as being its first modern systematiser but even
that is somewhat dubious. Perhaps like Malthus he ought rather to be seen as the one who
“caught the tide” at its peak and who has, thereby, come to be the identifiable locus by reference
to which capitalism began to come clearly into its own. Adam Smith could be called one of the
first and most able defenders of early capitalism in that the primary intent of his work Wealth
of Nations was to argue that capitalism needs to be defended against those factors that will
hamper and even destroy it, chiefly monopolies. (Smith, of course, does not use the term
‘capitalism’ as it was not as yet coined.) If we were to look for an earlier figure with a greater
claim to being the earliest systematiser of early capitalism then a prime candidate would be Sir
William Petty (1623-87) and that by reference to his work Political Arithmetick (1690).
Certainly the historian of economics Alessandro Roncaglia argues, with due qualification,
along these lines.30 Petty was an early champion of the extension of the natural sciences to
cover the social sciences, and that by way of the “quantitative method.” This method, Petty
argued, consisted in “reducing many terms of matter to terms of number, weight, and measure,
in order to be handled mathematically.”31 In his method Petty followed the lead of those earlier
philosophers (as well as contemporary ones) who rejected Scholastic metaphysics for a method
that, it was held, was empirical being based upon a materialistic-mechanical view of the
universe.32 A view well expressed by Galileo who wrote, “This great book which is open in
front of our eyes – I mean the universe – …is written in mathematical characters.”33 By this
Galileo meant to depict the universe as a machine, for machines were the examples wherein
the principles of mathematics were most clearly seen as being operative.34

29

Of course there were those who did critique Malthus and later advocates of population control and eugenics
on just this score. But by and large these were the religious, especially by way of the teaching of the Catholic
Church. But the very fact that these critiques were (and still are) treated as being beyond the pale, of being of
religious sentiment and not so-called science, hence that should have minimal say in the secular economic and
political realm, evidences just how dominant the logic is of programmatic modernity.
30
Alessandro Roncaglia, The Wealth of Ideas: A History of Economic Thought. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006). For a history of Petty see Ted McCormick, William Petty and the Ambitions of Political
Arithmetic. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). Petty, in my opinion, ably stands as representative of those
theorists and defenders of capitalism who manage to find employment under the auspices of government. Petty
applied his methods to Ireland when hired by Cromwell to do what we would call a demographic survey of that
land. Providence clearly smiled upon Petty for he managed in the process to enrich himself. We might note that
some hold Petty’s friend John Gaunt (1620-74) to be the author of modern demographics.
31
Roncaglia, 55.
32
Roncaglia, 55-56.
33
Cited in Roncaglia, 57.
34
History is rarely a matter of smooth transitions, hence in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries differences in
viewpoint as to acceptable methods are clearly evident. See by way of example the work by James Barry Jr on
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III.

A Change in the Concept of Nature

This fundamental change in the way in which the world and all that it contains,
including humanity, was to be understood (and thus studied, governed and shaped) is well
known, indeed for most (if not all) historians of ideas it is this change that defines the beginning
and rise of modernity proper.35 It is this change that will later give rise to what Turda refers to
as the common element in programmatic modernism, namely eugenics and the rise to
dominance of Foucault’s biopolitical neoliberalism. When Foucault spoke of neoliberalism as
a formal system and did so in order to characterise the nature of the biopolitical, the meaning
is not, at first, clear. When we understand, however, that the birth of modernity is attended by
the rise of a new view of nature, one that specifically excluded Scholastic metaphysics (and for
an increasing number all metaphysics), which exclusion was expressed in the dominance of
mathematical modelling and quantifying, then Foucault’s meaning becomes clearer. If there is
one discipline that is, above all others, expressive of a formal system then it is mathematics.
Everything, including human life and the body itself, has become subject to the strictures of
this formal system. A formal system which makes itself felt through the economy of capitalism,
in particular its late modern and global form, namely neoliberalism.
In his essay on the rise of economic individualism, Alfred Chalk, following on the work
of Harold Laski and H. M. Robertson (and to a lesser degree R. H. Tawney), detailed how all
of the major components of free market theory, those later championed by Adam Smith and
other eighteenth century figures, were to be found in the literature of the latter half of the
sixteenth century in England.36 Chalk’s argument is that the rise of economic liberalism
attended the change in the way natural law was understood. “In brief, the spirit of Thomism
was, in most respects, the antithesis of that which was later to prevail during the liberal
revolution.”37 This was especially the case in respect of the pursuit of self-interest in matters
of business and profit.38 The upshot was that state regulation of the market was to be rejected
the differences between Bacon and Descartes, and later between Descartes and those that followed after
(Measures of Science: Theological and Technological Impulses in Early Modern Thought. Evanston, Ill.:
Northwestern University Pr., 1996). However, it is also true that there is one dominant current of thinking that
wins the day. As Edward Dolnick puts it in his book The Clockwork Universe: Isaac Newton, the Royal Society
and the Birth of the Modern World (New York: Harpers, 2011) in the course of the seventeenth century the faith
was that “all things are numbers” (124), and that science is the “language of mathematics, the measure of
quantity” (95).
35
See for example the comments by Dorinda Outram The Enlightenment: New Approaches to European
History. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). Outram notes that the term ‘political economy’ is first
used in 1615 to describe the science of production, of buying and selling, and their relationship to the law,
custom and government (43). Frederick Beiser wants to qualify this view somewhat in his The Sovereignty of
Reason: The Defense of Rationality in the Early English Enlightenment. (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1996). Certainly, rationalism represented the rise of a new concept of the natural sciences. Rather than these
sciences being understood through the lens of metaphysics, they came to be understood by way of mathematical
and mechanical models. Only there were those who resisted this (16). This is true, only the current was heading
to the new model’s dominance. See too the thesis of Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. 3rd ed. (Norfolk:
Duckworth, 2007): 82-5. Joel Kaye in his Economy and Nature in the Fourteenth Century (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998) argues that we already see in the fourteenth century a turn to understanding
nature in terms of mathematics, which turn was beginning to be expressed as well in economics. But in response
we might note that in the study of history it is not so much about what was or was not present but what was
dominant that defines an age.
36
Alfred Chalk, ‘Natural Law and the Rise of Economic Individualism in England,’ Journal of Political
Economy 59, no. 4 (1951): 332-347.
37
Chalk, ‘Natural Law and the Rise of Economic Individualism in England,’ 332.
38
One might qualify somewhat Chalk’s argument. In fact questions as to what constituted a just price in relation
to profit and the self-interest of the seller were not unique to these late sixteenth century thinkers. The
Scholastics had pursued this issue, not least St Thomas himself. For this reason some, like Joseph Schumpeter
have argued that the Scholastics have their place as well in the history and formation of capitalism. See, Rodrigo
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(in certain cases some authors made an exception, noticeably in the case of trade between
nations – but these too would soon come to be rejected). The belief was that the liberal concept
of freedom was expressive of and in harmony with “the law of nature,” a freedom expressed
pre-eminently so in the individual acting in his own best interest. If the state were to thrive then
this freedom ought not to be hampered. The early modern liberal theorists repeatedly referred
to the futility of opposing these laws of nature. “During the early decades of the seventeenth
century the conviction that the flow of trade was subject to inexorable natural laws was
becoming a commonplace.”39 Exemplifying this is the comment from an economic document
that Chalk sees as especially significant, one dated December 4, 1550: “Nature will have her
course.”40 The argument being that it is best, then, that the state keeps out of Nature’s way and
not impose artificial price controls on the market. In the same spirit, William Petty would later
write of the “vanity and fruitlessness of making Civil Positive Laws against the Law of
Nature.”41 That Nature should agree with men set on making a profit is serendipitous indeed,
no wonder then that the same kind of language will continue to be used and that in the discourse
on population control. We find it employed over a century later in the writings of Malthus who
opposed the reformist zeal of the likes of William Godwin. Godwin thought that with the
granting by a government of political equality many of the troubles between people would
come to a halt. But this was not the case, for the spanner in the works, Malthus argued, “was
not government but nature.”42
IV.

Nature as a Closed System

The change in the concept of nature that attended the beginnings of early capitalism is
summed up by Chalk so: “The great creative minds…gradually came to view the world as an
intricate machine in which each part played a role that was rigidly predetermined by inexorable
laws.”43 Laws expressed in mathematics, ones which favoured the pursuit of gain, self-interest,
and an individualism that was not to be unduly imposed upon by the government.
There is, however, another significant change that began to take place, one that
answered to the incipient logic of liberalism; a change that will call into question this early
modern concept of nature as the determinative principle by which social matters must be
regulated. The language of the first liberal proponents of what would later come to be referred
to as the free market is that of an opposition to Scholastic metaphysics, but later theorists would
argue that this opposition was not consistent enough. These earlier figures were still under the
spell of Scholastic metaphysics. Thus, for all of its break with what went earlier nevertheless
the early modern liberal understanding of freedom is informed by a classical, even Aristotelian,
concept in which freedom names a positive state wherein one is in accord with Nature proper.
Freedom is not simply a negative state that names a ‘freedom from’ but rather a ‘freedom for’.
To be free is to accord with Nature with a capital ‘N’. But following on from the critiques of
Hobbes, Descartes, Locke and Hume any idea of a metaphysical system by which man must
draw himself into accord with Nature is increasingly brought into question.44
Muñoz de Juana, ‘Scholastic Morality and the Birth of Economics: The Thought of Martin de Azpilcueta,’
Journal of Markets and Morality 4, no. 1 (2001): 14-47. However, Chalk is right, in my opinion, to argue that
the concept of nature behind the changing views as to what constituted a just price had changed significantly so.
39
Chalk, 339.
40
Chalk, 337.
41
Chalk, 343.
42
Porter, The Malthusian Moment, 59.
43
Chalk, ‘Natural Law and the Rise of Economic Individualism in England,’ 343. It ought to be noted that
Chalk is not unfavourable to this development in economic thinking.
44
On what is called by some the rise to dominance of the ‘historicist’ philosophy in eighteenth to nineteenth
century liberalism, see Robert Denoon Cumming, Human Nature and History: A Study of the Development of
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As touched upon above, those who believed in the perfectibility of humanity were
characterised as utopians, thinkers who were still under the spell of metaphysics. For this
reason they were held to be imminently impractical men who would lead the world into
bloodshed and ruin. It is the same argument employed in more recent times against ‘utopians’
of all stripes, especially those who advocate a different system to that of neoliberal capitalism.
It is found, for example, in Hannah Arendt’s influential critique of totalitarianism, a work that
became something of a talisman for late twentieth century liberalism. It is a line of thinking
that has, since at least the latter part of the eighteenth century, become the dominant position
in liberal thinking. But that it wasn’t always so needs to be stressed, for in registering this
change we are better placed to see what it is that constitutes the essential elements in both
economic and cultural liberalism, and how this logic informing liberalism will be played out.
It is an effect alluded to at the beginning of this paper when we cited Foucault’s comments on
the solidity of things becoming increasingly fragile. Comments which bore the imprint of
Marx’s statement that under capitalism “all that is solid melts into air.”
Early liberalism is informed by a profound change in the conception of the universe. It
is a change that is evident both in those who kept to the earlier form of religious belief and
those who didn’t, who instead chose to progress to what they considered to be more enlightened
views. In studying the early modern period there is thus some confusion for similar concepts
can be found operative in those who claim to Christian orthodoxy and those who do not and
who are, in fact, opposed to it. The clearest example of this is in the seventeenth into the
eighteenth century in respect of those who have been termed ‘Deists’. The term has come to be
considered by some historians as of limited value, even at times a bit misleading for it can
cover a number of different views. However, the term does have its uses when it serves to
denote those who came to hold to an essential autonomy to creation while not entirely excluding
the existence of a God other to creation. An autonomy congenial to both the Deist and the
atheist (indeed for this reason the Deist was often referred to as an atheist), and an autonomy
more often than not discoursed upon under the language of mathematics. It is this autonomy
that constituted the freedom of creation, albeit a freedom that is expressed in terms of
inexorable laws to which we humans ought to comply which laws were expressed in
mathematics. An autonomy that informed the idea of Nature referred to above. Hume would
later call into question whether there really were any actual inexorable laws, and if so are they
even knowable? Contrary to what is popularly thought, Hume’s work, the Dialogues
Concerning Natural Religion (1779), is not primarily aimed at revealed religion, but rather at
the kind of religion that affects to trace out the divine mind in the mechanics of the cosmos –
in short what we would call Deism or more recently Intelligent Design.
What one sees taking shape from our early economic theorists on, through Hobbes and
Descartes, to Locke to Hume is an aversion to and then rejection of any and all metaphysical
language, and any reasoning founded upon that language. Concomitant with this was a
reconsideration of morality, for if traditional morality was based upon theological and
metaphysical givens, which givens sat ill with the now posited autonomy of Nature, then what
kind of morality answered to this the modern age? What kind of morality attended the new
Liberal Political Thought, Vol. 1. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1969). Denoon traces the rise of
‘psychological’ and social categories in place of earlier metaphysical ones by which human nature and the state
were to be understood and improved upon. By ‘historicist’ is meant here the idea that “all questions of political
institutions are relative, not absolute…” (23, Denoon is here quoting John Stuart Mill). That is, they are not
metaphysical questions answerable to by metaphysical answers, rather are they subject to the vicissitudes of
historical contingency. With the post-modern turn in the second half of the twentieth century it will be argued
that even this historicism was informed by a ‘white mythology’ that instantiated a Eurocentric privilege (see
Robert Young, White Mythologies: Writing History and the West. (London: Routledge, 1990)).
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economy? For some, like Mandeville in his famous The Fable of the Bees: or Private Vices,
Publick Benefits (1732), what was once considered vice and destructive of the social
commonwealth, ought now to be considered conducive to its health! Vice, self-interest, and
luxury are essential to the prosperity of a market economy.45 They answer to the mathematical
models that express the autonomy of nature, a nature which, in matters social, is best expressed
in the free-market economy.
To recap, the dominant current of thinking was that Nature is a machine to be studied
and manipulated by way of the empirical sciences informed by mathematics. This manipulation
can only be effected by bringing our processes and methods into accord with the laws of this
machine, hence the central importance of mathematics.46 Thus, Julien de la Mettrie’s work Man
a Machine (1747) argued that nature exhibited a “built in finalism” that required no explanation
dependent upon anything external to nature.47 Man is no exception, it is in this sense that he is
a machine, albeit subordinate to the greater machine that is Nature. Nature being autonomous
in that it defers to nothing other to itself (be it to God or Platonic like Ideals) approximates to
a formal system. It is a formal system insofar as it is a closed system.48
But as the logic of this approach works itself out something strange begins to become
apparent; although a machine conjures up images of solidity and weight, Nature understood as
a machine begins to seem rather ethereal. There begins a decline into insubstantiality. A decline
that will become fully apparent, as we will see below, in more recent decades. It is a logic that
begins to make itself felt in the arguments of David Hume. Not only is the discipline of
metaphysics rejected (that’s pretty much a given by Hume’s time) but any idea of a nature
proper to things that can become the basis for a hard and fast epistemology becomes
increasingly tenuous, if not dubious.

See Joseph Cropsey, ‘Adam Smith’ in History of Political Philosophy, eds. Joseph Cropsey and Leo Strauss
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987). Cropsey details something of the connection between
“liberal capitalism” and the “sceptical” and “scientific” principles upon which Hume set out to found all
philosophy (636). In this, Cropsey argues, Locke led the way (641). For Hume and his like-minded colleagues
the engine of progress “was the ignoble desires and strivings of man, channelled through the economic
institutions of production and distribution” (656).
46
As Richard Olson notes in his Science and Religion 1450-1900 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2004) by the mid-16th century there were any number of different takes on ‘nature’ and thus on the
character and ends of science (47). There was thus a “striking rise in the number of works devoted to natural
theology” especially in England in the 17th century (85). The methods used in the pursuit of science might be
shared but assumptions could differ as to what they were founded upon and to what end should they serve. In a
like manner the understanding of mathematics could differ. But this is so to this day. As Reuben Hersh notes in
his book What is Mathematics Really? (London: Jonathan Cape, 1997) there are two basic views about the
discipline: one he calls Formalism by which is meant that mathematics only describes its own rules (7); the
other is Platonism wherein the discipline defers to real Ideals or Forms (9). But by and large the development
evident in the modern period is one in which mathematics is held to really correlate to the nature of the universe
as a closed system (see footnote 49 below). Hence the universe, being mathematical in character, represents a
formal system in that no other external system with its concomitant logic impinges upon its workings. It might
be argued that not all closed systems are formal systems, a position that finds its defenders in this our late
modern period. I want to discuss and critique this view in a later article in this series when I treat of Derrida,
Guattari, Deleuze and like theorists.
47
Lester Crocker, ed., The Age of Enlightenment: Selected Documents. (London: Macmillan, 1969), 17. See too
the references to Hobbes and the Royal Society in Porter, Flesh in the Age of Reason, 56-72. Porter also
observes that there were those who took to task the mechanical view of things, such as the Cambridge Platonists
(83-87), but it is clear theirs was not the dominant view.
48
“A collection of objects – particles, waves, or whatever – is a called a system. A system that is either the
entire universe or is so isolated from everything else that it behaves as if nothing else exists is a closed system.”
George Hrabovsky and Leonard Susskind, The Theoretical Minimum. (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 2.
45
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Early liberalism is informed by a concept of Nature that is, by and large, opposed to
earlier Scholastic concepts, but time will show that informing liberalism is a logic that will end
up rejecting any and all concepts of a nature proper to things. What Foucault brings out is that
nowhere is this more evident than by reference to the body as the locus of the identity proper
of a person and, thereby, of the rights that attend an individual. It is the body that becomes the
locus proper of the operation of liberal (and thus capitalist) ideology, hence it becomes the
clearest expression how the value of a thing can be abstracted from any so-called essence of
that thing. A point raised in the first essay of this series in respect of the justification for
abortion. The value of the unborn human life is not located in the actual biological body of the
baby but in its potential for personhood if allowed to live. That this has ramifications for
classical liberalism is something Foucault explored, after all in early modernity the body of the
individual formed the fundamental principle that undergirded the idea of private property, and
of all else that follows on from this in respect of the relationship between the individual, the
market, and the state (most famously enunciated and argued for in the writings of John
Locke49). If the body has no essence proper, then to what do the rights of an individual refer?
This question underlies a good deal of discussion and debate today not least in reference to the
status of personhood in respect of animals and machines (of which more below).
V.

Anti-Essentialism

Foucault argued that we can trace the rise of the biopolitical in the way in which
morality in matters sexual came to be translated into scientific and medical categories, which
categories in turn can be grouped under the term ‘sexuality’. Whereas morality, traditionally
understood, operated by way of a metaphysical grounding in reference to divinely appointed
principles to be found in nature (and revelation), the principles of sexuality are to be found by
reference to a concept of Nature that has become not only decidedly less about morality but at
the same time less ‘metaphysical’. To use more recent terms, the change is from an essentialist
to an anti-essentialist understanding of Nature, so much so that the very word ‘Nature’ (or even
in its more qualified sense as merely lower case ‘n’ nature) is regarded as dubious in that it
serves as a mask and a means of legitimisation for a dominant ideology that seeks to impose
itself upon the individual. As there is no essence to anything, then there is no definitive category
or law to which one must answer; it is in this absence of essence that the freedom of an
individual has come to consist. And, as we will see below, it is in this absence of essence that
the freedom of finance capital consists. It is in this confluence of cultural freedom and financial
capital that the biopolitical reveals itself.
So it is that what was once solid has melted into air. Or, for reasons that will soon
become apparent, we might rephrase this famous saying in this way: What is solid has been
translated into data, reduced to ‘information’, made subject to the vicissitudes of the virtual
and in the process made more conformable to the dictates of financial capital.50
49

In particular his Two Treatises of Government (1689). In his An Essay Concerning the True, Original, Extent
and End of Civil Government 2:4 Locke writes that political power needs to consider “what state all men are
naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and
persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the
will of any other man.” Thus, as this was the original state, a state now compromised by a social contract, then
government must seek to come as close to this state, as far as is possible so as to retain social concord. Private
property and the freedom of the individual self are here made synonymous.
50
See, McKenzie Wark ‘All that is Solid Melts into Airwaves’ (54-59) in Everlasting Uncertainty:
Interrogating the Communist Manifesto 1848-1998, eds. G. Dow and G. Lafferty (Sydney: Pluto Press, 1998).
Wark quotes Marx in the Grundrisse: “capital drives beyond national barriers and prejudices…it is destructive
towards all of this [that is, traditional morals and cultural constraints] and constantly revolutionises it, tearing
down all the barriers which hem in the development of the forces of production…” (57). Wark argues that this
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It is in the area of sexual politics that anti-essentialism has found its primary theoretical
expression, and this by way of developments in feminist theory particularly since the late 1970s
and 1980s. Earlier feminist theory was, by and large, ‘essentialist’ in that it held that there is
an essence to being a woman that marked a woman off, in both an epistemological and
ontological fashion, from men. It was a view, however, that came to be seen as harbouring a
racist and class-based ideology. ‘Gender essentialism’ (as it came to be known) claimed in
good Enlightenment fashion to be universal and egalitarian was, however, at root expressive
only of the “lived experience of middle-class white women.”51 It was this critique of early
feminism that would increasingly become a commonplace as anti-essentialism gained ground
in the 1980s.
In her overview of questions concerning gender, Mary Holmes summed the issues up
by reference to the body. The question of gender “centres around the problem of to what extent
(gendered) bodies are natural entities with some sort of fundamental essence and to what extent
they are endlessly malleable products of social life and discourse.”52 Essentialism, Holmes
noted earlier in her book, “is the idea that there are identifiable necessary properties which
define objects, for example it supposes that there is some essence (usually with a bodily basis)
which is what makes a woman a woman.”53 Holmes’ sympathies lie on the anti-essentialist side
of the argument.54 Perhaps the most famous and most influential theorist of anti-essentialism
is Judith Butler. In her best known work Gender Trouble, Butler critiqued the very notion of
an ‘I’ and did so by way of the body as the assumed locus of sexual difference and thus gender
identity. Butler argued against the “ontological priority” given to sexual roles over factors that
have to do with “social visibility,” by which she means that in thinking that there is something
substantive about gender and the gendered ‘I’ we do not see that gender has a performative
origin, an origin that masks itself.55 “The substantive ‘I’ only appears as such through a
signifying practice that seeks to conceal its own workings and to naturalize its effects.”56 As a
corrective to this she offers up drag as a means to revealing gender’s imitative and contingent
structure; which is to say, transvestitism reveals the non-essential performative character of
gender.57 Drag strips away the ideology of essentialism to reveal the absence of any nature
proper to sexual difference. Butler’s is thus an “anti-foundationalist approach” which expresses
itself in the “expansion of existing identity concepts.”58 More recently, however, some argue
process is now gone up a notch or two with the rise of the virtual economy. Capitalism, he writes, “liquidates
old ideological forms, transmitting itself through walls, rendering them transparent” (58). Capitalism now needs
and is creating a “fully abstracted information landscape in order to function” (59). Which, of course, it now has
brought about.
51
Nancy Dowd, ‘Introduction’ in Feminist Legal Theory: An Anti-Essentialist Reader, eds. Nancy Dowd and
Michelle Jacobs (New York: New York University Press, 2003), 5. A little later in ‘Part 1: Theories, Strategies
and Methodologies’, Dowd writes how these earlier “universalist, essentialist perspectives” masked a white
middle-class heterosexual model of gender (10-11). K. King ‘The Situation of Lesbianism as Feminism’s
Magical Sign: Contests for Meaning and the U.S. Women’s Movement 1968-72,’ Communication 9, no. 1
(1986): 65-92. More recently polyqueer theorists such as Mimi Schippers in her book Beyond Monogamy:
Polyamory and the Future of Polyqueer Sexualities (New York: New York University Press, 2016) have
accused earlier feminist and queer theorists of championing a “homonormativity” (8) that by working for
marriage they have thereby given support to the idea of monogamy and for this reason support the old way of
“heteromasculine domination and white privilege” (28).
52
Mary Holmes, What is Gender? Sociological Approaches. (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2007), 174.
53
Holmes, What is Gender?, 88-89.
54
Holmes, 61.
55
Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. (New York: Routledge, 1999
[1990]), 22, 33, 173, 177, 189.
56
Butler, 184.
57
Butler, 175.
58
Butler, 21.
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that all talk of gender classifications or “sex markers” no matter how fluid and diverse ought
to be removed from anything that functions as a requirement in the public realm, be it in
colleges, businesses, or banks.59 This, at least, will avoid all the problems associated with the
current ever-expanding range of gender identities or what Butler called “identity concepts.” 60
VI.

The Rise of Cybernetics

A related development in the 1980s was the rise of Cybernetic Theory, in particular
what has been referred to as Cyborg Feminism. An early proponent for this development was
Donna Haraway in her now famous essay A Cyborg Manifesto.61
“A cyborg is a cybernetic organism,” writes Haraway, “a hybrid of machine and
organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction.”62 It is with women that
the recognition of the absence of anything like hard and fast boundaries, ones based on
ontological givens, marks this our age of capital and technology. “In short, the certainty of
what counts as nature […] is undermined, probably fatally. The transcendent authorization of
interpretation is lost, and with it the ontology grounding ‘Western’ epistemology.”63 Thus is
undermined all “justifications for patriarchy, colonialism, humanism, positivism, essentialism,
scientism and other unlamented –isms” but also “all claims for an organic and natural
standpoint.”64 As “sexuality, reproduction, family and community life are interwoven” in our
“new economic structure,” and that in “myriad of ways,” then we must reconsider how the
body is now to be located within a matrix of the organic and the machine.65 If we are to
overcome the dominant socio-biological ‘myths’ that affect to tell us of our origins, and thereby
of our supposed nature proper, then we (well, especially women) are to embrace new
technology, to become, fully so, cyborgs. There must be no opposing of the organic to the
technological. 66
It is this embrace of technology that will bring about the “permeability of boundaries”
which will, in turn, aid the fusion not only between humans and machines, but with animals as
well: “we can learn from our fusions with animals and machines how not to be Man, the
embodiment of Western logos.”67 In “explicitly embracing the possibilities inherent in the
breakdown of clean distinctions between organism and machine and similar distinctions
structuring the Western self” then will the “matrices of domination” crack, thereby opening up
59

For example see, Heath Fogg Davies, Beyond Trans: Does Gender Matter? (New York: New York University
Press, 2017), 20, 101-3, 142.
60
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Revel, ‘Identity, Nature, Life: Three Biopolitical Deconstructions,’ Theory, Culture & Society 26, no. 6 (2009):
48. Revel agrees and expands on Foucault’s argument.
61
Donna Haraway, ‘A Cyborg Manifesto’ reprinted in The Cybercultures Reader, eds. D. Bell and B. Kennedy.
(London: Routledge, 2000 [1991]), 291-324.
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Haraway, A Cyborg Manifesto, 291.
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new status in this cycle of marriage exchange” (293). Haraway in more recent years has, to the consternation of
some, departed somewhat from her original manifesto. Although not, it would seem, the accent on human and
animal interactions (see her The Companion Species Manifesto (2003). See Jenny Turner’s review of Haraway’s
recent writings ‘Life with Ms Cayenne Pepper’ London Review of Books 1 June, 2017.

Published by ResearchOnline@ND, 2017

15

Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 5

to a myriad of “geometric possibilities.”68 While on the one hand people are less than “fluid,
being both material and opaque,” on the other hand “cyborgs are ether, quintessence.”69 It is
the state of being cyborgs that we are to strive for by embracing technology and the ability it
affords us to fully realise our non-essential nature, to become as ether. All that is solid is to
melt into air. The indicative status of Marx’s diagnosis concerning the effects of capital has
now become an imperative; the imperative to realise the chief of all values, namely a freedom
from any determinative nature whatsoever; a freedom from essence.
In the absence of any essence all things can become ‘fluid’, become plastic, become
malleable; there are no fixed borders, all boundaries are rendered permeable, a fact that is, first
and foremost, played out on the body. Haraway appeals to the new generation of theorists
(especially feminist theorists), those in the forefront of becoming cyborgs: “Cyborgs might
consider more seriously the partial, fluid, sometimes aspect of sex and sexual embodiment.”70
They must always keep in mind that all boundaries are to be subject to “construction and
deconstruction.”71 As there is no essence proper to things then no identity is fixed, no border
impermeable, all is fluid, and all can now be subject to a will that, in union with technology, is
able to shape a world made virtual. It is the body with its sex-become-sexuality that is the locus
of this development for biology and technology are no longer two distinct realms. Here is
realised the early modern liberal hope. Here is the biopolitical!
The ideas Haraway championed would soon enough morph into what is now referred
to as ‘posthumanism’ and, in certain quarters, would come to be tied to the utopian hope often
termed the ‘Singularity’. A time in which humanity and technology would fully merge together
in what might be called the grand Internet-of-Things.72 Meaning by this that so melded together
are computer technology and the biological that any distinction between the real and the virtual
disappears. “For good or for ill […] the era of posthuman possibilities is beginning,” writes
Chris Hables Gray in his work Cyborg Citizen.73 Now is the age of freedom, exemplified in
“the right to control and change one’s own body,”74 where all can “determine their own sexual
and gender orientations.”75 Thus “simplistic male/female categories cannot stand against the
polymorphous desires of so many people mobilized by so much cyborg technology.”76 Indeed,
cyborg science not only “changes genders” it can “create new ones.”77
“This image of the human journey toward a superior ‘posthuman’ may be difficult for
many to take seriously,” writes Gregory Stock in Redesigning Humans, “but the determination
to use whatever new technologies emerge from today’s explorations of human biology aligns

Haraway, A Cyborg Manifesto, 311). “High-tech culture challenges” all the primary dualisms of Western
thinking, including that between “God/man”, and it does so by reason that it is “not clear who makes and who is
made in the relation between human and machine” (313).
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Humans Transcend Biology. (London: Duckworth Overlook, 2005). It is pertinent to the thesis of this article
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kinds of complex mathematics that informs financial capitalism and his cyborg utopia (see S. Patterson Dark
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well with prevailing attitudes.”78 However, though “most geneticists say the eugenic goal of
reducing the number of deleterious genes in the population is an important one,”79 it is not an
easy task to make “ourselves anew.”80 We are assured though that with the right economy in
place things will be alright: “What is more,” Stock concludes his book echoing those early
modern writers we met with earlier, “a free-market environment with real individual choice,
modest oversight, and robust mechanisms to learn quickly from mistakes is the best way both
to protect us from potential abuses and to channel resources toward the goals we value.”81
The narrative of modernity has gone from the language of being in accord with nature
to now not only shaping nature but creating it as well; creating a hybrid and cyborg world in
which terms such as ‘unnatural’ have no meaning at all. It is a contemporary view captured
well by Philip Ball in his book on creating life and making people. The role of humanity in
shaping nature is “already one of the major narratives of the twenty-first century.”82 The term
‘unnatural’ has nothing to do with physical world but is, Ball writes, “a metaphysical and moral
category, born out of a perpetually uneasy relationship with techne and imbued with judgments
of value and propriety.”83 Values which had to do with the status of the unborn, but as these
values were attendant upon metaphysics they suffered along with metaphysics, and the unborn,
like all else, fell under the determinations of technology, which is to say by reference to what
are held to be practical and beneficial outcomes. Ball quotes approvingly from the work of
Michael Mulkay who wrote: “we should abandon any attempt to try to settle once and for all,
the ontological standing of the human embryo…we should concentrate instead on the practical
task of specifying the degree to which the circumstances under which new human entities can
be manipulated and, indeed, destroyed in order to bring about beneficial outcomes.”84
Since the beginning of modernity the way in which liberalism has set about
manipulating both the world and humanity is by translating all into the language of mechanism
and, more basic still, into the language of mathematics. Into the language of a formal system
par excellence. A language that both informs the dominance of virtual technology and the
biopolitical, a circumstance especially evident in the growing discipline of biomedia.
VII.

Biomedia and the Virtual

Today, writes Eugene Thacker, the “assumption is that there exists some fundamental
equivalency between genetic ‘codes’ and computer ‘codes’, or between the biological and
digital domains.”85 Biomedia “is an instance in which biological components and processes are
technically recontextualised in ways that may be biological or nonbiological.” 86 Here there is
no “body anxiety,” rather is there “the will to transcend the base contingencies of ‘the meat’ in
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favour of virtual spaces.” There is now the ability and willingness to use “informatics capacity
to enhance biological materiality” and thereby to create a “body more than a body.” 87 We are
engaged in a “boundary crossing process” one that works within “the complicity of materiality
with information.”88 Thereby is the biological optimized; more than that it is “impelled to
realize, to rematerialize, a biology beyond itself.”89 The real and the virtual begin to merge.
Biological reproduction elides with technological reproduction which, as Anthony
Giddens argued, spells the end of nature: “The invasion of the natural world by abstract systems
brings nature to an end as a domain external to human knowledge.”90 For this reason
“reproduction is now a field where plurality of choice prevails,” just as it does in the freemarket.91 While biology answers to technology, technology answers to the economy, and at
each stage a concept of freedom as a freedom from the strictures of nature orients the progress
and development of the system. The body of the individual becomes the locus of the meeting
of base and superstructure, which is to say the locus of economic and cultural liberalism. What
is perhaps most telling about this turn is that, like Foucault who led the way in theorising this
state of affairs, it is unclear if commentators approve of it or not. In fact, one gets the strong
impression that they approve.92
If eugenics, as Turda argued, is at the very heart of programmatic modernity then what
we have seen above is significant indeed; it tells us of something even more fundamental to
modernity than eugenics, something that eugenics is an expression of. We saw earlier that
eugenics expressed itself by way of ideals that answered to the dictates of Nature with a capital
‘N’. Whether by way of improving the general stock of the populace in terms of class, or of
purging a people in order to bring about the purifying and regeneration of a race, the underlying
concept was one of being in proper accord with Nature. From the beginning, eugenics and
population control were inextricably entwined and, via the claims of science as the new arbiter
of natural law, both answered to mathematical modelling. A modelling that also informed the
creation of the modern capitalist economy both in its nascent and fully developed forms.
Whether it be in respect of demographics, eugenics, or more generally the empirical sciences
the concept of Nature still held sway, albeit in a very different way to how it was envisaged
prior to the rise of modernity. In more recent decades, however, eugenics answers not to a
concept of a nature proper to things but to the concept of the plasticity of all things.
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Accordingly, it has become the means by which humanity is not merely to be bettered but is to
be transformed into something greater than the human. The earlier form of eugenics was
‘essentialist’; the contemporary form is ‘anti-essentialist’.93 The earlier form of eugenics
operated under an ostensibly humanist program; contemporary eugenics has a transhumanist
program.94 Early eugenics thought in terms of the natural world; contemporary eugenics thinks
in terms of the cybernetic. Eugenics has become a technology oriented to a world in which all
boundaries are rendered permeable, not merely those between human and other species, nor
simply between life and machine, but a world in which it makes no sense to speak of a boundary
between the real and the virtual. A world increasingly subject to the mathematical.
Eugenics is morphing into a formal system, by which is meant that it does not answer
to anything outside of the principles by which and in which it operates; which principles are of
piece with those of mathematics. As biology elides with technology, as technology increasingly
answers to the demand of the virtual economy, then, as the virtual exists by reason of
mathematical code, all becomes translatable into mathematics. Mathematics being the formal
system par excellence. It is this that Foucault intuited in his lectures on the biopolitical when
he wrote that neoliberalism has turned the economy into a formal system to which all else must
submit.
What Foucault intimated we are now in a position to see being played out, for
capitalism, having achieved close to global dominance, has today come into its own, it has
subordinated all else to itself. It is not simply a case that all things have been commodified in
that they ultimately answer to a market value, but that having been commodified they are able
to be translated into mathematical data, into ‘information’ that being ‘fluid’ can be subsumed
into the ever circulating value of the electronic flow that is the virtual world of financial capital.
It is a process that necessitates both economic and cultural liberalism, for although the latter
often affects to oppose the former its concept of freedom is informed by the same logic of antiessentialism that operates within and drives economic liberalism. The ideology of antiessentialism is necessary for the biopolitical eliding with the virtual. The logic of capitalism is
the logic of the virtual. In other words, the biopolitical is the virtual. It is in the merging of the
real with the virtual that the hope of ultimate individual freedom is being promised and
marketed. It is exactly here that the ideology of capitalism is being fully realised, it is here that
its nature is being revealed.
What, then, is capitalism?
VIII. The Nature of Capitalism
Although the fuller answer to this question must wait for the completion of this series,
it is appropriate to give some indication here of what it is we mean by the term ‘capitalism’ if
only to distance ourselves from the more popular usage of the term. In popular use ‘capitalism’
often serves as a kind of catch-all term for anything that people happen to dislike and, thereby,
its use becomes a form of shorthand for ersatz rebellion. Among an ever increasing list the term
has become identified with money, the rise of morality, the role of markets and consumption,
A similar point is made, though to different ends, by Christine Mills in ‘Biopolitics, Liberal Eugenics, and
Nihilism’ in Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty and Life eds. M. Calarco and S. DeCaroli (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2007), 180-202.
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in which neoliberalism has grown to shape the biopolitical in respect of more market oriented eugenics. This is
made abundantly clear in the rise of transhumanism: “Deeply embedded in such transhumanist writings [they
refer here to the writing of Ray Kurzweil] is the possessive individualism of the neoliberal economy, where the
mantra is choice and the consumer king or queen” (156).
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private property, business and profits, and with war, sexism, racism and even the rise of the socalled nuclear family and heteronormativity.95 However, if we want a definition that tells us
more than the likes or dislikes of the disaffected then we need something a little more specific.
We require a definition that will help us to identify its presence as it develops in economies
that are not per se capitalist, as well as a definition that identifies an economy as being capitalist
in its own right. The simple definition followed here (and to be expanded upon in the rest of
this series) is that capitalism is that system which instantiates and facilitates the creation of
monetary value through the promotion of and circulation of credit and debt.
Many (if not most) historians of economic theory place the birth of capitalism sometime
in the mid to late Renaissance, for convenience’s sake somewhere in the sixteenth century.
Now it may well be true that capitalism begins to come into its own at this time, however its
antecedents can be traced as far back as the third millennium BC to the ancient near east (a
point to which we will return in the next article in this series). It may also be that the antecedents
arose at the same time as coinage (or other form of money), but it would be a mistake to see
them as identical. Whether or not money began as a semiotic system to denote commodity
value and facilitate barter is a question that is probably impossible to answer with any kind of
historical certitude. But in respect of capitalism we can say that the value of money is not, first
and foremost, tied to its signing a commodity other to itself; rather is the value attendant upon
money oriented to a system in which it becomes increasingly self-referential, self-circulating,
and self-fructifying. With due qualification we might say it is when capital value becomes
financial capital, where the latter needs no tangible asset to give it value.96 For example,
whereas it used to be held that at least a portion of circulating money value needed a real
reference, say to gold reserves, this has not been the case now for some decades. Capitalism
has always been oriented to the ideal of a formal system, but the logic that seeks to realise this
goal has taken a while to work itself out. In order to become a formal system all boundaries,
all borders, all friction must be removed. Strange as it may seem, the very absence of reference
to an asset that denotes a real presence of value (and which thereby grounds the circulation of
financial capital) is the prerequisite for capitalism’s achieving its goal. To chance a paradox,
this absence is of the ‘essence’ of the system. Any real reference represents an impediment to
the system; represents unacceptable friction that impedes the flow and speed of circulation.
Both the orientation and the logic of capitalism calls forth the dominance of the virtual. As
Cédric Durand puts it, using the terminology of Marx, the shift to the “capitalist mode of
production” is seen in the “rising power of fictitious capital.”97 He later quotes Marx to the
95
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effect that “everything in this credit system is duplicate and triplicate, and is transformed into
a mere phantom of the mind.”98 All that is solid indeed melts into air for, in some manner, what
is solid conforms itself to an economy that breeds phantoms and fictions.
The most simple and primitive form capitalism takes is when a loan demands more by
way of return than the principal.99 For much of history this process was termed ‘usury’ and
was, up until the modern period, by and large universally denounced (at least ostensibly so). It
might be said that modernity can be defined as the age in which usury was not only made
acceptable but positively encouraged; it becomes an economic virtue. As was noted earlier in
this article, it should occasion no surprise that other vices, ones often associated with usury,
came likewise to be hailed as virtues insofar as they stimulated the economy. 100
The history of capitalism is the history of the development of debt into usury and thence
into an ever increasing number of ingenious financial vehicles/products.101 We now live in a
world in which financial vehicles/products have become so many and varied, so quick and
subtle, so mathematically complex that only the algorithms know what they are up to and how
they work together to comprise the financial market.102 Importantly, it is this market that
characterises what it is that is meant by ‘globalism’ for, although this term can mean different
things to different people, common to all definitions is that of a “frictionless world of shared
meanings.”103 A world in which, through the power of communication technology, all meaning
is abstracted and disembedded, where distance is made irrelevant, where the goal is the ideal
of unfettered and thus immediate circulation, where almost instantaneously capital is created
(or destroyed).104
In the world constituted by the circulation of finance, pride of place belongs to
international currency speculation, it being the most lucrative form the financial market takes
and to which all other markets ultimately answer.105 Currency speculation is thus the formal
98
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system become global, something that would have been all but impossible to fully realise
without the rise of virtual technology.106 But deeper still, without the rise to dominance of antiessentialism, and that in matters both economic and cultural, the dominance of the virtual
would itself have been impossible.
IX.

Usury and Sexuality

In his work The Specter of Capital, Joseph Vogel begins his treatise on the nature of
capitalism by way of Don DeLillo’s book Cosmopolis. He agrees with one of the central tenets
of Cosmopolis which is to the effect that “market culture can absorb revolt and anarchy as vital
expressions of its own system, treating protest as a fantasy spawned by the free market itself
and capitalism as the consequential self-optimization of that fantasy.”107 The power of
capitalism is that in embodying the immanentistic power of self-referential formalism, a power
brought to fruition in anti-essentialism, it is its own double. This is a topic to which we will
return in depth in a later essay in this series, for the moment however we need, via Vogel’s
work, to conclude our tracing out of the self-referential, immanentistic nature of capitalism.
The power of capital resides in its formal nature, in its becoming a self-organizing
system.108 Something made possible by the “mathematization of economic science.”109 “The
sphere of circulation becomes autonomous […] is subject only to its own laws.” The “selfreferential nature of finance is institutionalized,”110 such that now we live under a “regime of
free-floating signifiers” that no longer defer to “any transcendental signified.”111 “The
representative power of the sign has been relocated: it now lies in the capacity to facilitate
transfers through self-reference.”112 The global financial market is a “self-referential and
therefore frictionless universe,” in which all things social are “embedded” and by which all
relations are ‘optimized’.113
Capital “denatures nature itself” and is thereby a “spectral double or travesty of the
natural order.”114 In this travesty of nature “perversion” rules in that money comes to be selfreproducing, it is an “end in itself” and becomes its own father.115 At times Vogel turns to the
language of the pre-modern and early modern philosophical and theological commentators to
damn this “industrious infertility,” for as he notes the name they gave to this economy was
106
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‘usury’. Perhaps most telling of all was that in the medieval and early modern cosmos, usurers
and sodomites were placed in the same circle of hell.116 As Foucault rediscovered, economics
and sexuality were understood in the pre and early modern worlds to be inextricably entwined.
X.

Conclusion

In his book The Culture of Usury in Renaissance England David Hawkes traces out a
picture of the early modern period as being that which not only witnessed the beginning of the
rise to dominance of capitalism proper, but that saw as well the effects of this on society and
morality, and, in fact, on the psyche itself. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Hawkes
writes, “witnessed an utterly unprecedented explosion” in the power of usury. 117 Usury is
defined as “any excess whatsoever above the principle of a mutuum, or loan executed by reason
of the loan itself.”118 Although this might strike us as rather innocuous the early moderns felt
differently, as Hawkes notes they were very much alive as to what the ramifications would be
of the general acceptance and even praise of usury. Unlike them, we are, by and large, blind to
its effects and the study of usury, Hawkes argues, has as a consequence been neglected.
“Perhaps the reason for this neglect is that usury has so successfully remolded postmodern
culture in its own image that it has rendered itself, or at least its social and psychological effects,
invisible. The fish knows nothing of water.”119
To repeat, the early moderns were alert to the kind of logic usury instantiated and what
the effects would be as this logic worked itself out in the economy and on morality.120 An effect
that would be especially evident in the area of sexual behaviour. “The pornographic,
commercialized sexuality of the postmodern world would have been understood by the people
of Renaissance England as an entirely predictable consequence of our society’s domination by
usury.”121 With the growth and acceptance of usury there was a corresponding change in
consciousness, a change seen, most fundamentally of all, in the way in which signs and
representation were understood to operate. The “order of representation” was “rearranged in
people’s psyches,” thus the internal operations of the mind were being fundamentally
altered.122 It is precisely in respect of the body as it expresses itself in the sexual act that this
change is revealed.
Usury was seen by the early moderns (and pre-moderns as well) as being of a piece
with unnatural sexual activity, sodomy being the case in point.123 Here we need to recall
Foucault’s point mentioned earlier in this article, this being to the effect that in the early modern
world people spoke of moral dereliction rather than of ‘sexuality’, of a decision of the will
rather than of a scientifically defined category. Sodomy was held to be allied to usury as both
were seen to be unnatural acts, acts that sinned against nature. Just as usury abstracted the value
of money from its representative function in which it signed substantial goods, sodomy made
an abstraction of sex orienting it away from its proper telos (which is reproduction) and
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redirecting it to a sterile, self-pleasing act.124 Sodomy oriented the sexual act away from a real
substantial outcome and, being now oriented toward the ‘same’, the act was rendered infertile.
Like masturbation and contraception, sodomy represents the turning of an act that is meant to
be directed to a substantial other into an act oriented to self-referentiality – to an insubstantial
pleasure. Hawkes observes that the same logic not only informs usury but is in the circulation
of financial capital made all the clearer: money as a sign of something other becomes a sign
that is “self-referential and self-generating.”125
Here, then, is the rise of the modern ‘homo oeconomicus’ that Foucault spoke of in his
lectures on the biopolitical, for here is the self-seeking individual and autonomous actor, the
entrepreneur, who instantiates the rationality of self-interest.126 Here is where the formal logic
of neo-liberalism finds its embodiment, but in the body become insubstantial, become virtual.
A body the meaning of which is abstracted from any natural essence, rendered fluid, and the
value of which finds its locus proper under and in the circuit of financial capital. The conclusion
being that the biopolitical is nothing more and nothing less than the triumph of usury.
And usury is what the Church has always condemned.
The next article in this series will explore the Church’s condemnation of usury in more
depth and then do so by reference to its condemnation in Scripture.
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